Ninety Days of Oil, No Days of Food
This is the third part of W4's four-part series Europe at Risk. The first part, Europe Is Drying Up, showed that in August 2026 50% of the territory of the EU and the UK was in some degree of drought. The second, When the Cooling Water and the Power Run Out, showed the low Danube pushing nuclear plants on its banks to the brink of shutdown and taking Romania's Cernavodă offline. The EU cereal harvest is put at about 262 million tonnes, maize is 20% below its five-year average (European Commission, 2026b), and losses from climate extremes in 2026 could reach €90 billion (European Commission, 2026c).
This part begins with a legal imbalance. Under Council Directive 2009/119/EC, every member state must keep oil stocks equal to at least 90 days of average net imports or 61 days of inland consumption, whichever is greater. There is no equivalent for food. "No days" does not mean empty warehouses; it means no EU law says how long a food reserve must last. This part looks at what happens when one point in the chain fails, what has been promised, and what should be done.
Low to moderate, for now
The official verdict is reassuring. The Commission's expert group, the European Food Security Crisis preparedness and response Mechanism (EFSCM), rated the risk to food availability at 2.5 on a five-point scale in its autumn 2026 assessment, "low to moderate", and the risk to affordability at 3.0, "moderate" (European Commission, 2026a). It finds "no indication of systemic shortage at EU level", although "temporary disruptions for specific regions and sectors cannot be excluded". The EU remains a net cereal exporter in 2026/27, even if net exports shrink from 18.1 million tonnes to 10.2 million tonnes (European Commission, 2026b), and food prices in August were only 0.3% higher than a year earlier.
That picture is an EU average. The same assessment warns that "more than individual impacts, it's the compounding nature of the current risks" that matters, and most respondents expect things to worsen over the next six months. The European Environment Agency already rates the risk that heat and drought pose to crops in southern Europe as "critical" (EEA, 2024), and water scarcity has affected about 30% of EU territory every year since 2000 with no sign of shrinking (EEA, 2025). Behind the average lie deep regional losses: grain maize yields in France were 29% below the five-year average, in Austria and Slovakia 28% (JRC, 2026).
The cushion is thinning. DG AGRI's balance sheet puts EU cereal stocks at the end of June 2027 at 35.4 million tonnes, down from 46.6 million tonnes a year earlier (European Commission, 2026i). By W4's calculation that is about 50 days of total EU use, against 65 days the year before. These are commercial stocks at their pre-harvest low, not state reserves, and the next crop refills them. The real buffer is the harvest and the trade that moves it, and those are exactly what drought and blocked routes hit.
One link breaks, the rest follow
The clearest account of the weakness comes from the Commission itself. Its 2021 food contingency plan warns that "a disruption in another economic sector can result in disturbances in the food chain. That way, packaging material shortages threatened the supply of eggs during the COVID-19 crisis" (European Commission, 2021). It records that 76% of the oilseed meal fed to EU livestock is imported and that three countries supply 85% of EU soya imports, and says planning must work even when "energy supply is no longer ensured".
The food chain does not break where food is grown but where it needs energy, packaging or power.
In August 2022, with gas prices at their peak, EU industry shut 70% of its ammonia capacity because gas made up as much as 90% of the variable cost of production (European Commission, 2022). The carbon dioxide that ammonia plants yield as a by-product is used across the food industry, including in slaughterhouses. In Britain a single company, CF Fertilisers, produced around 60% of the country's CO2, and in 2021 the government paid operating support to get its plant running again (BEIS, 2021). In 2022 the continent ran short of CO2 and of AdBlue, the urea solution that modern diesel lorries need to run.
A 2017 analysis found that 55% of internationally traded maize, wheat, rice and soybeans passes through at least one maritime chokepoint, and that the Turkish Straits alone carry a fifth of the world's wheat exports (Bailey & Wellesley, 2017). In 2026 low water on the Rhine and the Danube restricted shipping, including feed and fertiliser imports (European Commission, 2026a).
The shop is exposed too. On 11 October 2026 attackers took over the remote controllers of refrigeration systems in French supermarkets. France's national cyber-response team warned of "numerous compromises" of Danfoss, Copeland and Dixell controllers (CERT-FR, 2026), and a French Senate committee heard that the attack had broken the cold chain of "several dozen supermarkets" (Sénat, 2026). Estimates put the number of stores affected at about 700. A power cut works faster still. On the day of the Iberian blackout, 28 April 2025, card payments at Spanish supermarkets fell by 63%. Large stores kept trading on generators while local shops without them closed, and fewer than 4% of the country's cash machines have an alternative power supply (Cremades et al., 2025).
Card payments on the day of the Iberian blackout, Spain
change in % · 28 April 2025 against Monday 7 April
Source: Banco de España (Cremades et al., 2025)
| Small retail | -69 |
|---|---|
| Supermarkets | -63 |
| Restaurants | -62 |
| Total | -55 |
| Petrol stations | -46 |
| Large food and retail chains | -35 |
Just in time: days on the shelf, not months
Food retail keeps as little stock as possible. The UK food security report says the risk is "compounded by a prevailing 'Just in Time' (JIT) model and low stock approach", that "large stockpiles are not held", and that the report itself "does not include data on contingency planning" (Defra, 2024). In one example, all the calcium carbonate added to British flour comes from a single quarry in France, and the French farm protests of early 2024 reached that chain too.
In July 2026 the German government told parliament that it keeps no record of how many days of stock retailers hold, and that the high degree of just-in-time processes in retail and wholesale carries "inherent risks" in a prolonged, global transport disruption (Bundesregierung, 2026). Dutch researchers estimate that after a cyberattack on supermarket logistics the shelves could be empty in two to three days (Radboud University, 2026). March 2020 showed the speed: in a single week German sales of rice ran 208% above normal and flour 105% (Destatis, 2020). What households can do is the subject of Part 4.
Reserves nobody counts
If shelves last days, public reserves should be the next line of defence. The EU has no clear view of them. In 2021 the Commission wrote that strategic reserves "are maintained in at least seven Member States", mainly of staple grains, but that the size of commercial and public stocks is "not always known with accuracy" (European Commission, 2021). The EU Stockpiling Strategy of 2025 found "no proper overview of stockpiling efforts by Member States across the EU" (European Commission, 2025b). Only 18 of the 27 member states answered the EFSCM's 2024 preparedness survey; public food reserves can be set up in 10 of them and are actually used in 4, and not one country reported how much it holds or how long it would last (European Commission, 2025c).
The public record is uneven. Finnish law requires grain stocks covering at least six months of average consumption and has held nine months' worth since 2023 (Huoltovarmuuskeskus, 2023). Outside the EU, Switzerland's compulsory private stocks under federal contract cover three to four months per staple (BWL, 2025), and Norway is building a grain reserve of 82,500 tonnes, about three months of consumption, by 2029 (Landbruksdirektoratet, 2023). Germany last published figures for the end of 2021: 705,000 tonnes of grain and 126,000 tonnes of rice and pulses (Bundestag, 2022), which by W4's calculation is about 8 kg of grain per person. The civil reserve is meant to provide "at least one daily meal" in a crisis (BLE, 2025); current quantities are secret.
Sweden's new reserves act took effect on 1 July 2026 without any set volume; the government has earmarked SEK 455 million for grain and farm inputs in 2026 (Regeringen, 2025). Czechia's Supreme Audit Office found in 2021 that state reserves of five of nine basic foods were below the minimum set by the agriculture ministry (NKÚ, 2021); public estimates put the Czech food reserve at just 1.3 days of supply. Austria, France and the Netherlands have no state food reserve at all. A study for the Austrian agriculture ministry concludes that existing stocks would see the country through the first year of a very severe drought, but that "for a second drought year, the supply situation would be critical" (BMLUK, 2026).
Public food reserves in Europe
Published figures, 2021–2026
| Country | Reserve | Covers about |
|---|---|---|
| Finland | State grain stockpile (at least 6 months by law) | 9 months of grain (2023) |
| Switzerland (non-EU) | Compulsory private stocks under federal contract | 3–4 months per staple (sugar 3, rice 4, edible oils 4, bread wheat 4) |
| Norway (non-EU) | State grain reserve (being built) | 3 months of food grain by 2029 (82,500 t) |
| Germany | Grain reserve and civil emergency reserve | 705,000 t grain, 126,000 t rice and pulses (2021); now secret; about 8 kg of grain per person (W4 calculation) |
| Sweden | State reserves (law in force from 1 July 2026) | No volume set; SEK 455 million for 2026 |
| Czechia | State material reserves | 5 of 9 basic foods below minimum levels (2021) |
| Austria | None | Commercial stocks: first severe drought year covered, second 'critical' |
| France | None | – |
| Netherlands | None | – |
| EU | No mandatory reserve | Commercial cereal stocks at end-June 2027 about 50 days of use (W4 calculation) |
Source: Huoltovarmuuskeskus (2023), BWL (2025), Landbruksdirektoratet (2023), Bundestag (2022), BLE (2025), Regeringen (2025), NKÚ (2021), BMLUK (2026), European Commission (2026i); W4 calculation
Promises without deadlines
Most of Brussels' recent promises on water and food are recommendations, guidance or proposals, and the binding parts arrive between 2028 and 2030, while the drought is already here. Under the Water Resilience Strategy the EU "should aim" to improve water efficiency by at least 10% by 2030, and member states are merely "encouraged to set their own targets" (European Commission, 2025a). Of the 18 national authorities that replied to the Commission's latest screening, only 10 had carried out a national risk assessment of their food supply chain, and only 7 had a crisis communication plan that explicitly covers food security (European Commission, 2026f).
EU promises and where they stand, November 2026
What Brussels has committed to for water and food supply
| Promise | Deadline | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Water efficiency up by at least 10% | 2030 | Non-binding; methodology still in preparation (2026–2027) |
| EU leakage threshold and action plans | 2028 and 2030 | Threshold not yet set |
| Wastewater reuse (2.4% today) | Evaluation by June 2028 | No EU target |
| Technical guidance on drought management plans | 2026–2027 | In progress; guidance only |
| Overview of member-state stocks | – | 'No proper overview' |
| National food-supply risk assessment | – | Done by 10 of 18 respondents |
| National food-security preparedness plans (CMO amendment) | 12 months after the regulation enters into force | Proposal; no obligation to hold stocks |
| 72 hours of household self-sufficiency | 30 October 2026 | Non-binding guidelines |
| Identification of critical entities (CER) | 17 July 2026 | 7 member states referred to the EU Court for failing to transpose |
| National climate resilience plans | 31 December 2030 | Proposal only |
Source: European Commission (2025a, 2025b, 2025c, 2026d, 2026e, 2026f, 2026g, 2026h), COM(2025) 553
Real work sits behind most rows, and the proposed climate resilience law would require binding national plans for water security. The problem is timing. The critical-entities directive should have been transposed by October 2024, yet in April 2026 the Commission took seven member states, among them France, Spain and the Netherlands, to the EU Court of Justice for not transposing any of it (European Commission, 2026g).
The drought came in 2026; the binding rules arrive between 2028 and 2030.
What Brussels and governments should do
The first six measures below appear in no EU plan as an obligation (checked against the texts); the seventh puts deadlines on what has already been promised.
- A minimum food reserve modelled on oil stocks. An EU directive could set how many days of grain, edible oil and feed protein each member state must hold, as public or Swiss-style compulsory private stock. The templates are Directive 2009/119/EC and Finland's six-month floor. The Stockpiling Strategy says only that member states "should discuss" appropriate minimum stock levels, and the proposed CMO amendment (COM(2025) 553) sets rules only "where Member States establish and manage reserves".
- Food retail inside the critical-entities law. Directive (EU) 2022/2557 and the NIS2 Directive cover only food logistics, wholesale and large-scale industrial production. Supermarkets, where the French attack and the Iberian payment collapse struck, are left out. Widening the annexes is a job for the EU; the Preparedness Union Strategy promises only to "identify further sectors and services not covered" (European Commission & High Representative, 2025).
- Minimum backup power and fuel for water utilities, food logistics and large stores. The directive asks only for "appropriate and proportionate" measures and names no hours or days. The EU should set a floor, and member states sector rules, for how long a waterworks, a cold store or a checkout must run without grid power. The Banco de España points to Estonia, where offline card payment is well developed for essential sectors such as food, fuel and pharmacies.
- Stocks of water-treatment chemicals. The Stockpiling Strategy itself names "chemicals for treating water" as a gap, then attaches no action, owner or deadline to it. A joint EU or regional stock of disinfection and coagulation chemicals is needed, plus a minimum storage duty for utilities.
- Binding cuts in water demand and drought triggers for every river basin. The 10% efficiency target should become binding, and every basin should have a drought management plan in which preset flow or storage thresholds trigger restrictions. France's Plan eau is the model: the government's 2026 review judges its 10% abstraction cut "achievable" (Ministère de la Transition écologique, 2026). Today 19 of 27 member states regulate drought management in law (European Commission, 2023).
- State reserves of fertiliser and feed. The German government confirms that it holds no physical stocks of fertiliser (Bundesregierung, 2026). Switzerland stocks nitrogen fertiliser for a third of a growing season and two months of feed protein; a study for the Dutch government recommends two to three months of soya meal, amino acids and vitamins (Clingendael, 2026). This is for national governments, with EU coordination.
- Deadlines for what has already been promised. The CMO amendment should require regular stress tests of the supply chain, not just stock data. The JRC published a method in April 2026 (Magnuszewski et al., 2026), but nobody has run it against a drought. Drought risk guidance is promised for end-2026; national climate resilience plans should come well before 2030.
The EU today keeps joint stocks of banknotes and animal vaccines, not food.
Power for the buffer: storage, grids, flexible demand
Part 2 promised a return to energy. Almost every link above runs on electricity: the cold chain, card payments, pumping and water treatment. The Commission's Grids Package puts the investment needed in EU electricity grids at €1.2 trillion by 2040, €730 billion of it in distribution. If nothing is done, 45% of cross-border capacity needs will be unmet by 2030, and up to 310 TWh of renewable power could go unused by 2040, nearly half of EU consumption in 2023 (European Commission, 2025d). Its legislative proposals are still under negotiation.
Storage and flexible demand have no binding targets either. Under Regulation (EU) 2024/1747, member states need only set an indicative national objective for non-fossil flexibility, including the contributions of demand response and energy storage. Desalination, which Part 1 listed among the possible answers, is a "last resort" in the Water Resilience Strategy, with no EU target or dedicated funding, and running it takes a great deal of power. Water, food and energy security form one chain, and nobody tests that chain as a whole.
The fourth and final part of the series, out on Saturday, turns to households: what families can do when one of these links gives way.
Editorial opinion
Europe's food supply chains are fragile: a single failing link, whether gas, power, packaging or one hacked refrigeration controller, reaches the supermarket shelf within days. Where reserves exist they last a short time, and most governments will not say how large they are. In W4 Magazine's editorial view, even after 2026 the leadership of the European Union and its member states is not seriously preparing for a drought lasting several years and the food shortages that would follow. The documents describe the risk well; the binding steps are missing or postponed by years. The oil-stocks rule proves that the EU can require a reserve counted in days when it chooses to. It should do the same for food and water, now, and not after the next drought.
Part 3 of the Europe at Risk series asks what keeps Europe fed when one link in the supply chain fails. EU law requires every member state to hold at least 90 days of oil; for food there is no such rule, and the Commission admits it has no proper overview of national stocks. Its expert group rates the risk to supply as low to moderate, but the risks compound: in 2022 Europe shut 70% of its ammonia capacity, during the Iberian blackout supermarket card payments fell by 63%, and in October 2026 attackers broke into the refrigeration controls of French supermarkets. Shelves can empty in days, and Finland is the only EU country with a public reserve measured in months. The article sets out what the EU and governments should do: a mandatory food reserve, food retail as critical infrastructure, backup power, stocks of chemicals, fertiliser and feed, and binding drought triggers.
After the 2026 drought, Part 3 of the Europe at Risk series asks what keeps Europe's food supply going when a single link breaks, and what the EU and national governments have done about it. It starts from a legal imbalance. Under Directive 2009/119/EC every member state must hold oil stocks equal to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of consumption, whichever is greater. For food there is no minimum of any kind, and the Commission says it has no proper overview of what member states store. Its food-security expert group rates the risk to availability as low to moderate, and the EU remains a net cereal exporter in 2026. Yet the risks are compounding and the chain is brittle: when gas prices peaked in 2022 the EU shut 70% of its ammonia capacity, a single fertiliser maker supplied about 60% of Britain's carbon dioxide, card payments at Spanish supermarkets fell by 63% during the Iberian blackout, and in October 2026 attackers broke into the refrigeration controls of French supermarkets. Shops hold days of stock, and public reserves are small or secret: Finland keeps nine months of grain, Germany no longer discloses its quantities, and an Austrian study finds a second drought year would be critical. Most EU promises are non-binding or take effect only between 2028 and 2030. The article lists concrete measures: a food reserve modelled on the oil rule, food retail inside the critical-entities law, backup power and fuel, stocks of water-treatment chemicals, fertiliser and feed, and binding demand cuts and drought triggers.
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